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Abstract
In this note we provide a new proof for the results of Lipton et
al. [3] on the existence of an approximate Nash equilibrium with
logarithmic support size. Besides its simplicity, the new proof leads
to the following contributions:
1. For n-player games, we improve the bound on the size of the
support of an approximate Nash equilibrium.
2. We generalize the result of Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [4]
on small probability games from the two-player case to the general
n-player case.
3. We provide a logarithmic bound on the size of the support of
an approximate Nash equilibrium in the case of graphical games.
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1 Introduction
The problem of the existence of a small-support approximate equilibrium
(i.e., every player randomizes among small set of his actions) has been studied
in the literature for the past two decades. Althofer [1] considered two-player
zero-sum games and showed existence of approximately optimal strategies
with support of size O(logm), where m is the number of actions. Lipton,
Markakis, and Mehta [3] later generalized this result to all two-player games;
i.e., they showed existence of an approximate equilibrium with support of
size O(logm). This result yields an exhaustive search algorithm for comput-
ing an approximate Nash equilibrium with a quasi-polynomial running time
(mlogm). This is the best-known bound today for computing an approximate
Nash equilibrium. Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [4] generalized the tech-
nique of Lipton et al. [3] to prove that in two-player games an approximate
Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in games that possess
a small-probabilities Nash equilibrium (see definition in Section 4).
The related problem of the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium (an equi-
librium with the minimal support) in subclasses of games has been studied
in the literature for much longer; see, e.g., Rosenthal [7] and Shmeidler [8].
A recent paper by Azrieli and Shmaya [2] analyzes the relation between the
influence that a player has on the payoffs of other players and the existence
of an approximate Nash equilibrium. They show that if the influence is small
enough, then such a game has an approximate pure Nash equilibrium.
In this note we provide a new proof for the results of Lipton et al. [3] and
Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [4] using similar techniques to those developed
by Azrieli and Shmaya [2]. Besides its simplicity, the new proof leads to the
following contributions:
1. For n-player games we improve the bound on the size of the support
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of an approximate Nash equilibrium from O(n2 logm) (see Lipton et. al. [3])
to O(n logm) (see Corollary 1).
2. We generalize the result of Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [4] from
two-player games case to all n-player game cases (see Corollary 3).
3. We provide a logarithmic bound (O(logn + logm)) on the size of the
support of approximate Nash equilibrium in the case of graphical games.
This bound is novel (see Theorem 1).
The note is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the notations
and preliminaries that will be useful in our new proof. In Section 3 we state
and prove the a result on graphical games; this result generalizes Lipton et
al. [3]. In Section 4 we state and prove the result that generalizes the result
of Daskalakis and Papadimitriou. Section 5 is a discussion.
2 Preliminaries
We consider n-player games where every player i has a large number of
actions. For simplicity, we will consider the case where all players have the
same number of actions1 m. We will use the following standard notations.
We denote by Ai = {1, 2, ..., m} the actions set of player i, and by A = ×iAi
the actions profile set. The simplex ∆(Ai) is the set of mixed strategies
of player i. We will assume that the payoffs of all players are in [0, 1], and
ui : A→ [0, 1] will denote the payoff function of player i. The payoff function
ui can be multylinearly extended to ui : ∆(A)→ [0, 1]. The payoff functions
profile is u = (ui)
n
i=1, which is also called the game. A mixed action profile
x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) is an Nash ε-equilibrium if for every action ai ∈ Ai, it
1Given a game where player i has mi actions, we can consider an equivalent game
where every player has m = maximi actions. This can be done by adding m−m
i strictly
dominated actions to every player i.
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holds that ui(x) ≥ ui(ai, x−i)− ε.
A mixed strategy xi = (xi(1), xi(2), ..., xi(m)) of player i will be called
k-uniform if xi(j) = cj/k, where cj ∈ N for every j = 1, 2, ..., m. Note that
the support of k uniform strategy is of size at most k. A mixed strategy
profile x = (xi)
n
i=1 will be called k-uniform if every xi is k-uniform.
We say that the payoff of player i depends on player j if there exists an
action profile a−j and a pair of actions aj , a
′
j of player j such that ui(aj, a−j) 6=
ui(a
′
j , a−j). A game where the payoff of every player depends on at most d
other players will be called a graphical game of degree d. Graphical games,
introduced by Kearns et al. [5], express the situation where players are
located on vertices of an underlying graph and their payoffs are influenced
only by their neighbors’ actions. Note that every n-player game is a graphical
game of degree n− 1.
2.1 Lipschitz games
Player i has a λ-Lipschitz payoff function if |ui(aj , a−j) − ui(a
′
j, a−j)| ≤ λ
for every i 6= j and every aj, a
′
j ∈ Aj . The Lipschitz property means that a
change of strategy of a single player j 6= i has little effect on the payoff of
player i. Note that player i can have a big effect on his own payoff. A game
will be called λ-Lipschitz if the payoff functions of all players are λ-Lipschitz.
The following proposition is an important property of λ-Lipschitz games.
Proposition 1. If in an n-player game the payoff of player i depends on at
most d players, and his payoff function is λ-Lipschitz, then for every pure
action ai ∈ Ai and for every mixed action profile of the opponents x−i, it
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holds that2
x−i(B) ≥ 1− 2 exp
(
−
δ2
dλ2
)
where B ⊂ A−i is defined by
B = {a−i : |ui(ai, a−i)− ui(ai, x−i)| ≤ δ}.
In simple words, Proposition 1 claims that if we randomize an action
profile a−i according to x−i, then probably player i will have approximately
the same outcome if he plays against a−i or against x−i.
Proposition 1 is based on the concentration of measure phenomena for
Lipschitz functions (see Ledoux [6]) and it is derived explicitly in Azrieli and
Shmaya [2].
2.2 From general games to Lipschitz games
We present a very natural procedure that constructs for every game a corre-
sponding game with the Lipschitz property.
Fix k ∈ N. Given a game u we construct a new game v = v(u, k) with kn
players as follows. We “split” every player i into a population of k players
i(1), i(2), ..., i(k). Each player i(j) plays the original game u against the
aggregate behavior of the n− 1 other populations of size k.
Formally, it will be convenient to present Ai as the set of vectors
{e1, e2, ..., em} ⊂ R
m, where ej is the j − th unit vector in R
m. In such a
representation the unit simplex ∆m := {(xj)
m
j=1 :
∑
j = 1, xj ≥ 0} is the set
of mixed strategies ∆(Ai). All players i(j) have the same actions set Ai. The
2By the notation x−i(B), we refer to x−i as a probability measure on A−i, and so
x−i(B) is the probability of the event B.
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payoff of player i0(j0) is defined by
vi0(j0)((ai(j))1≤i≤n,1≤j≤k) = ui

ai0(j0),
(∑k
j=1 ai(j)
k
)
i 6=i0

 .
Note that
∑k
j=1 ai(j)/k ∈ ∆
m; therefore, this vector represents the mixed
strategy of population i.
Remark 1. The game v has the following two properties:
(P1) v is 1/k Lipschitz, because a deviation of a single player i(j) changes
the mixed strategy that is played by population i only by 1/k.
(P2) Every pure Nash ε-equilibrium of the game v corresponds to a k-
uniform mixed Nash ε-equilibrium of the game u. The corresponding mixed
equilibrium will be the one where player i plays the aggregated strategy of
population i in the game v.3
3 General Games and Graphical Games
Theorem 1. Every n-player graphical game of degree d with m actions for
every player has a k-uniform Nash ε-equilibrium for k = 8
ε2
d(logn+ logm).
Usually graphical game models consider games with a large number of
players n of constant degree d. Theorem 1 proves the existence of a relatively
simple approximate Nash equilibrium where every player uses a strategy with
a support that is logarithmically small on n and m.
Lipton et al. [3] show that in every n-player game with m actions for
every player there exists a k-uniform Nash ε-equilibrium for k = O(n2 logm).
3Moreover, the opposite direction is also true. Every k-uniform ε-equilibrium of u
corresponds to a pure Nash ε-equilibrium of v. The corresponding pure equilibrium will
be the one where population i plays a pure profile with aggregated behavior xi, where xi
is the k-uniform strategy of player i in the ε-equilibrium in the game u.
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Theorem 1 applied to general games shows that in such games there exists a
k-uniform Nash ε-equilibrium for k = O(n logm).
Corollary 1. Every n-player game of with m actions for every player has a
k-uniform Nash ε-equilibrium for k = 8
ε2
(n− 1)(logn + logm).
As a straightforward corollary of this result, we derive the following im-
provement to the oblivious algorithm for computing Nash approximate equi-
librium in games with n players.
Corollary 2. Let k = 8
ε2
(n − 1)(logn + logm). Then the oblivious al-
gorithm4 that exhaustively searches over the k-uniform strategies finds an
ε-equilibrium in O(mn
2 logm) steps.5
Proof of Theorem 1. Let k = 8
ε2
d(logn + logm). We construct the game
v = v(u, k) as presented in Section 2.2. We prove that the game v possesses
a pure Nash equilibrium, then, by Remark 1 (P2) this concludes the proof.
Moreover, we will prove that every nk-player 1/k-Lipschitz graphical game
of degree dk has a pure Nash ε-equilibrium.
Consider a mixed action profile x that is a (possibly mixed) Nash equi-
librium of v. For every player i and every action b ∈ Ai of player i, we define
the set of action profiles
Ei,b := Ai × {a−i : |vi(b, a−i)− vi(b, x−i)| ≤ ε/2} ⊂ A.
Every action a∗ ∈ ∩i,bEi,b ∩ support(x) is a pure Nash ε-equilibrium ac-
cording to the following inequality:
vi(d, a
∗
−i) ≤ vi(d, x−i) +
ε
2
≤ vi(a
∗
i , x−i) +
ε
2
≤ vi(a
∗
i , a
∗
−i) + ε,
4The term “oblivious algorithm” is from [4].
5Lipton et al. [3] prove a bound of O(mn
3 logm) on the number of steps.
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where the first inequality follows from a∗ ∈ Ei,d, the second from a
∗
i ∈
support(xi), and the third from a∗ ∈ Ei,a∗
i
. Therefore it is enough to prove
that the above intersection is not empty.
By proposition 1 we have
x(Eci,b) ≤ 2 exp(−
ε2k
4d
). (1)
Putting k = 8
ε2
d(log n + logm) we get x(Eci,b) ≤ 1/(2nkm). There are nk
players in v, and m actions for every player. Therefore there are nkm events
Ei,b. Therefore, x(∩Ei,b) ≥ 1/2 > 0, which concludes the proof.
4 Small Probability Games
Following the terminology of [4], a profile of mixed actions x will be called
a c-small probabilities profile if xi(j) ≤ c/m for every player i and every
j ∈ Ai. A game u will be called a c-small probability game if there exists a
Nash equilibrium x that is a c-small probability profile.
Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [4] prove that in small probability two-
player games the oblivious random algorithm that samples k-uniform strate-
gies for k = Θ(logm) finds an approximate Nash equilibrium in O(c2mlog c)
steps, i.e., in polynomial time in m. Here we generalize this result to general
n-player games.
It will be convenient to think of the k-uniform strategies as a multiset
that contains k ordered actions. In such a case the set of k-uniform strategy
profiles is of size mkn.
Theorem 2. Let u be an n-player c-small probability games with m actions
for every player, and let k = 8
ε2
(n− 1)(logn+ logm). Then, among the mkn
k-uniform strategy profiles in u, the number of strategy profiles that forms
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an Nash ε-equilibrium is at least
mkn
2(nm)
8
ε2
(n−1)n ln c
.
Corollary 3. Fix n and let k = 8
ε2
(n−1)(logn+logm). Then the oblivious
algorithm that samples at random k-uniform strategies and checks whether
it forms an ε-equilibrium finds such an ε-equilibrium in c-small probability
games after (nm)
8
ε2
(n−1)n ln c samples in expectation, i.e., after polynomial
time in m.
Proof of Theorem 2. Fix k = 8
ε2
(n− 1)(logn+ logm), and let x be a c-small
probability equilibrium of u. Consider the game v = v(u, k) that is defined
in Section 2.2. Note that the action profile where every player i(j) plays the
mixed action xi is a Nash equilibrium of the game v. Denote this equilibrium
by xv.
Following the same analysis that was done in the proof of Theorem 1 we
define the sets Ei,b and we know that x
v(∩i,bEi,b) ≥ 1/2. Two different pure
action profiles in ∩i,bEi,b∩support(x
v) correspond to two different k-uniform
Nash ε-equilibria in u. Let us show that there are many different action
profiles in ∩i,bEi,b ∩ support(x
v).
Note that xv(a) ≤ (c/m)nk because x is a c-small probabilities profile.
On the other hand, xv(∩i,bEi,b) ≥ 1/2. Therefore, there must be at least
mnk/2cnk different profiles in ∩i,bEi,b ∩ support(x
v), which yield that there
are at least mnk/2cnk different k-uniform Nash ε-equilibria in u.
It only remains to evaluate the expression cnk:
cnk =
(
clnn+lnm
) 8
ε2
(n−1)n
=
(
nln cmln c
) 8
ε2
(n−1)n
= (nm)
17
ε2
(n−1)n ln c.
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5 Discussion
This note contains a new approach to the problem of an approximate small
support Nash equilibrium. Instead of considering the game itself, we can
consider a population game where every player is replaced by a population
of players and analyze the existence of an approximate pure Nash equilib-
rium in the population game. I believe that this approach might be useful for
analyzing other interesting questions. For example, the question of character-
izing the class of two-player games where an approximate Nash equilibrium
with constant support exists might have the following interpretation: which
two-population games with constant population size has a pure Nash equilib-
rium? Clearly, characterization of the above class is an important question
because for those games there exists a polynomial-time exhaustive search
algorithm for computing an approximate Nash equilibrium.
This paper provides an upper bound of O(n logm) on the size of the
support of an approximate Nash equilibrium. It is known that the bound
logm is tight even in two-player games (see Althofer [1]); i.e., there exists
a two-player game where no Nash approximate equilibrium with a support
smaller than c logm exists. The question whether the linear dependence on
n is also tight remains an open question.
Open problem: Does there exist an n-player n-action game where in
every Nash approximate equilibrium at least one of the players plays a mixed
action with support of size f(n)?
By Althofer [1] the answer to this question for f(n) = c logn is positive.
What about f(n) = cnα for α < 1? What about f(n) = cn?
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